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Abstract This paper explores the intersection between
three processes associated with globalisation. First, the rise
of emerging economies like China, Brazil and India, the so-
called ‘Rising Powers’, and their potential to define the
contours of globalisation, global production arrangements
and global governance in the twenty-first century. Second,
the importance of corporate social responsibility (CSR)
goals in the shaping of global trade rules and industrial
practices. Third, the significance of small firm clusters as
critical sites of industrial competitiveness. Some of the
most significant examples of successful, innovative and
internationally competitive small firm clusters from the
developing world are located in the ‘Rising Powers’ and
cluster promotion is a core element of national industrial
policy in some of these countries. There is also evidence of
engagement by clustered actors with corporate social
responsibility goals around labour and environmental
impacts. While these three processes have been separately
studied there has been no attempt to explore their inter-
sections. This paper addresses this gap through a compar-
ative analysis of secondary data, and a detailed reading of
the literature, on CSR and clusters in Brazil, China and
India. It assesses the evidence on small firm clusters in the
Rising Power economies and considers how these Rising
Power clusters engage with CSR goals pertaining to labour,
social and environmental standards. It argues for a greater
focus on the formal and informal institutional context,
termed the ‘social contract’, in explaining divergent expe-
riences and practices observed across these countries. This
raises important questions for future academic and policy
research on clusters, CSR and the Rising Powers. The paper
concludes by outlining a research agenda to explore the
local and global consequences of the relationship between
Rising Power clusters and international labour and envi-
ronmental standards.
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Introduction
The literature on the emerging economies, variously
described as the ‘BRICs’, the ‘Asian Drivers’ or more aptly
the ‘Rising Powers’, is rapidly growing (Kaplinsky and
Messner 2008; Henderson and Nadvi 2011; Henderson
et al. 2013; Lund-Thomsen and Wad 2014; Nadvi 2014).
While there are no singular definitions of what constitutes
an ‘emerging economy’ there is no dispute that China, and
to a lesser extent India and Brazil, are now key global
economic powers. China has become, over a very short
period of time, the world’s second biggest economy and the
biggest trading power on the planet, Brazil is the world’s
seventh largest economy and India the tenth biggest global
economic power. Sustained rates of economic growth (over
10 % a year for 30 years in China), have led to rising levels
of income and employment and a rapidly growing domestic
market marked by a significant and increasingly discerning
middle class (Guarin and Knorringa 2014). Manufacturing
and service sector firms from these countries are interna-
tionalising, rapidly becoming recognised global brands and
corporate multinationals (Fleury and Fleury 2011; Sin-
kovics et al. 2014). These new growth economies have,
through their economic dynamism and their global com-
petitiveness, come to shape the contours of the global
economy with substantial implications for global gover-
nance (Breslin 2007; Cohen 2001; Henderson and Nadvi
2011).
While this is now acknowledged, what remains unrec-
ognised is the significance of small- and medium-sized
enterprise clusters (SMEs) in propelling the economic
dynamism of the Rising Powers (RP).1 Interest in SME
clusters spans the disciplines of business studies, economic
geography, innovation studies and international develop-
ment, with conceptual and empirical research on cluster-
based economic dynamism in developed and developing
country contexts (Bathelt et al. 2004; Ketels 2013;
Malmberg and Maskell 2002; Martin and Sunley 2003;
Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 2006; Porter 1990; Schmitz and
Nadvi 1999). While earlier cluster studies sought to iden-
tify the basis of competitiveness and upgrading by local
firm agglomerations, a more recent strand of the literature
has begun to explore the links between clusters and cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR) goals of improving
labour conditions and environmental impacts (Battaglia
et al. 2010; Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2010a, b; Lund-
Thomsen and Pillay 2012; Puppim de Oliviera 2008).
Although, as Blowfield and Frynas (2005) observe, CSR as
a concept can have multiple meanings to different actors
and, thus, be difficult to pin down, our view aligns with that
of Lund-Thomsen and Pillay 2012 who describe it as a
process wherein corporate actors integrate economic, social
and environmental concerns into their core business
activities. But we go further by suggesting that this also
requires a need to recognise the multiple interests of
diverse stakeholders that shape this process, including
firms and their owners (shareholders), workers, suppliers,
local communities, local institutions and the state.
SME clusters proliferate in Brazil, China and India,
often in sectors where these countries have experienced
growing international competitiveness (Das 2005; Dinh
et al. 2013; Pires et al. 2013). Moreover, there is evidence
that in some of these clusters there is a degree of engage-
ment, and contestation, around CSR concerns (De Neve
2009, 2014; Puppim de Oliviera 2008; Lund-Thomsen and
Nadvi 2010b; Sachdeva and Panfil 2008). Our focus in this
paper is to explore the intersection between these three
distinct processes associated with globalisation and global
transformations: first, the emergence of Rising Power
economies; second, the role of small firms clusters in
promoting industrial development and international com-
petitiveness; and third, the growing importance attached to
CSR norms and linked social and environmental impacts
by firms, civil society and public actors. Our proposition is
that it is in these spatial contexts that we may well observe
some of the most significant experiences around how small
firm clusters not only compete in the global economy, but
also how they engage with CSR concerns, and potentially
shape CSR discourses for the future. Moreover, we are
interested in exploring differences between Brazil, China
and India to see how a comparative perspective might
provide us a better understanding of future transnational
governance practices on CSR norms and labour and envi-
ronmental regulations.
The paper draws on a close and extensive reading of
secondary data and published and grey literatures. Our
aims in this paper are three-fold. First, we seek to under-
stand the role played by SME clusters in these economies.
If clusters are important to Rising Power economies then
we should be able to observe some indication of the sig-
nificance of their presence, their specific roles in promoting
the economic dynamism and international competitiveness,
1 We define clusters as sectoral and spatial agglomerations of firms,
often with linked institutional actors, that together can generate the
basis for economic competitiveness and promote local economic
development (Schmitz and Nadvi 1999; Parrilli et al. 2013).
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and the nature of national policy engagement around SME
clusters within these Rising Power economies. Second, we
consider how these Rising Power SME clusters interact
with concerns around labour and environmental standards.
To date, the literature on global process standards and their
impacts on local clusters has concentrated on dynamics
within the cluster and also the relationship between clus-
tered actors and their global principles. In this paper we
argue that one aspect that tends to get neglected in this
discussion is the ways in which national policy frameworks
associated with social compliance affect the ways clusters
respond to such issues. This institutional context, what we
term here as part of the national ‘social contract’, is in our
view a missing element of the jigsaw that one needs to
understand in order to assess how SME clusters in the
Rising Powers confront social, environmental and labour
pressures. The institutional context includes the public and
private formal organisations, rules, public regulations and
industry practices as well as informal norms and values of
the different actors to be found in, or that engage with,
local clusters. The importance of the institutional context is
increasingly acknowledged in research on global value
chains and global production networks (see Neilson and
Pritchard 2009; Smith 2014) but tends to be relatively less
well understood by those working on clusters and CSR (a
gap also recently observed by Pyke and Lund-Thomsen
2014). Third, we want to consider the consequences of our
findings for future research agendas on clusters and CSR
linkages. This has implications not only for policy actors
seeking to define future cluster development strategies, but
also for academics working on the relationships between
local clusters and global value chains and how these ties
are impacted upon by pressures on labour, social and
environmental concerns. Thus, we aim, through this paper,
to formulate an agenda for further enquiry.
The paper is structured as follows: The next section
provides a brief overview of our core conceptual frame-
works that underline the economic gains that SMEs accrue
from local clusters, how local clusters integrate into global
value chains (GVCs), and how standards and CSR concerns
affect the governance of local cluster ties and global
linkages. We point to gaps within the literature and
emphasise the need for further understanding of the insti-
tutional contexts that shape local cluster ties as well as
linkages between cluster actors and the global value chain.
We then provide an overview of the evidence on SME
clusters, and cluster development strategies observed in
Brazil, India and China. We illustrate how the evidence and
policy discourse on clusters in these countries is also linked
to a particular political economy engagement on what we
refer to as the dominant ‘social contract’ that has prevailed
in these economies during the past three decades. It is this
political economy relationship between state, civil society
and business that has in effect set out norms and values that
shape local attitudes to labour, social and environmental
standards. We go on to reflect on the implications of this in
shaping a research agenda for further work on how Rising
Power clusters are engaging with, challenging, and poten-
tially shaping labour, social and environmental standards
and the implications that may arise from this for issues of
local cluster and global value chain governance. We con-
clude by emphasising the importance of the local and the
public spheres and the consequences that could arise for
future research on clusters, global value chains and CSR.
Clusters, Global Value Chains and the Institutional
Context for CSR
The concept of clustering, and the agglomeration econo-
mies that it can potentially generate for co-located SMEs,
is now well understood (Porter 1990; Schmitz and Nadvi
1999; Gordon and McCann 2000; Martin and Sunley 2003;
Ketels 2013). Clustering owes it origins to the work of
Alfred Marshall who illustrated how small firms in the
industrial heartlands of UK and Europe had acquired crit-
ical external economies of scale and scope by locating
within geographically defined areas. The concomitant
division of labour between firms, and the rise of speciali-
sation and flexibility enhanced the competitiveness of such
clustered regions (Marshall 1920). The phenomenon is now
observed extensively across Europe, the United States, and
most notably for our purposes in developing country con-
texts. There are multiple case studies from the developing
world that illustrate how clustering can help SMEs, often
working in precarious and informal settings, produce for,
and effectively compete in, highly demanding local and
global markets (Knorringa 1999; McCormick 1999; Nadvi
1999a; Tewari 1999; Rabellotti 1999; Schmitz 1999). At
the same time, it is clear that such gains are differentiated
over space and time. Clusters that were internationally
competitive at one point in time can find their position
eroded as new actors, new competitive challenges and new
forms of technological innovation come to the fore. Hence,
analysis of developing country clusters studied over time
show that competitive success is not guaranteed, that the
engagement of institutional actors can rise and fall, and that
gains from clustering are not only highly differentiated but
can also clearly impact the dynamic tendencies within a
specific cluster.2
2 The most notable examples of this are the Sinos Valley shoe cluster
analysed by Schmitz (1995, 1999), Bazan and Navas-Alema´n (2004),
and Navas-Aleman (2011) and the Sialkot surgical instrument and
sports goods clusters researched by Nadvi (1999a, b, c, 2004, 2008),
Nadvi and Halder (2005) Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi (2010b), Lund-
Thomsen (2013), and Lund-Thomsen (2013).
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Cluster research also indicates that alongside agglom-
eration economies, clustered firms can engage in various
forms of co-operation and collective action. Such gains can
enhance competitive advantages, through the setting up of
marketing consortia, research and development and the
upgrading of local skills and technological capabilities. But
ensuring collective action can succeed in an environment
where clustered SMEs are also in close competition with
each other requires complex mechanisms of institutional
support as well as socially embedded norms of trust
(Humphrey and Schmitz 2002; Nadvi 1999c). Local clus-
tered institutions, such as formal business associations as
well as informal social practices can alongside public
agencies help clustered firms to effectively and simulta-
neously compete and co-operate (Nadvi 1999d).
Local clusters also connect to global markets through a
variety of trade linkages, through intermediary traders as
well as with global buyers and global lead firms that pro-
vide access to global markets (Schmitz and Knorringa
2000). The literature on clusters and GVC linkages offers
extensive illustrations of this (Schmitz 2004; Nadvi and
Halder 2005). The GVC framework provides a heuristic
model to understand how global production is undertaken
by various independent and geographically dispersed actors
who collectively turn raw materials into finished goods and
services that can be traded in distant markets. Central to the
GVC model is the role of ‘lead firms’ who organised and
structure and thus effectively govern the ties within the
value chain: determining who does what, where and at
what price. Much of the recent literature on GVCs has been
concerned with two inter-connected issues. First, how do
firms within the chain upgrade, take on higher value added
activities, and effectively capture the rents that accrue from
this (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002; Kaplinsky 2005). The
second is what determines the governance of the chain
itself (Gereffi et al. 2005; Ponte and Gibbon 2005; Ponte
and Sturgeon 2014). Gereffi et al. (2005) have argued that
the governance of chain ties is rooted in the attempt by lead
firms to minimise transaction costs in their supplier link-
ages. Thus faced with the opposite options of pure market
based transactions at one end and a hierarchical firm
structure at the other, lead firms in value chains have opted
for distinct forms of network relationships. The nature of
these network ties being determined by the capabilities of
the supplier, the complexity of the transaction, and the
extent to which the transaction can be easily codified. This
framework has been used to show how local clustered
producers can be integrated into global value chains with
differing levels of power asymmetry between clustered
suppliers and global lead firms. This framework has,
however, been critiqued on the grounds that it is both static
and that it fails to recognise that in the multi-scalar con-
texts in which most GVC ties are organised there may be
more than one given governance arrangement in place (Coe
et al. 2008). Recent work by Ponte and Sturgeon (2014)
provides scope for considering a multi-polar governance
agenda.
These recent interventions are significant for consider-
ing the ways in which local clusters insert themselves into
GVCs. The interaction, as well as tension, between local,
cluster-based, governance and different levers of global,
GVC, governance has been highlighted within the literature
as important for understanding how local clusters engage,
upgrade, and compete in global and local markets (Hum-
phrey and Schmitz 2002, 2004; Messner 2004; Nadvi and
Halder 2005; Navas-Aleman 2011).
In the literature on the linkages between local clusters
and global value chains (see, for example, Humphrey and
Schmitz 2004; Nadvi and Halder 2005) there is a tendency
to address, albeit unevenly, two distinct aspects of gover-
nance. First, the ‘global’ governance within the GVC as
exercised by the global lead firms who co-ordinate the
chains, and by virtue also extract the most significant rents
from it (Kaplinsky 2005). One aspect of this global gov-
ernance is the increasing importance of the trade rules that
pertain to quality assurance, health and safety, environ-
mental, and labour compliance concerns (Bartley 2003,
2007; Nadvi and Waltring 2004; Nadvi 2008; O’Rourke
2003; Henson and Humphrey 2010). Such ‘rules’ are at
times publicly enforced through regional and national
regulatory measures (such as European Union directives on
food safety, or waste disposal, for example). In some cases,
such ‘rules’ are privately set and assessed, through com-
pany specific codes of conducts, or sectoral codes and
standards formulated by multi-stakeholder initiatives that
bring together corporate and non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs), and yet have equally significant implications
where they become ‘de facto’ if not ‘de jure’ norms that
define and restrict market access. Where compliance con-
cerns with such public and private rules are especially
acute global governance pressures within the chain can
lead to more tightly defined relationships with clustered
producers, requiring more effective and at times indepen-
dent monitoring to ensure that rules are met.
The second aspect of governance in cluster-GVC link-
ages is the role of local institutions and local governance
processes. This, however, is relatively less well understood.
There is some research that explores local cluster gover-
nance through an investigation of the role of local business
associations and other support institutions and the ways in
which they help clustered firms to collectively enforce
rules (Nadvi 1999d, 2004). But local governance is much
more than the formal institutions that form part of the
cluster landscape. As Hess (2004), and others, argue
regional firm agglomerations are socially embedded within
a particular milieu. This generates norms and values of
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trust and ‘good’ business behaviour and culture. There are
a few studies that investigate non-formal forms of local
governance, including an analysis of trust linkages and
social networks within local clusters (Battaglia et al. 2010;
Laha 2014; Nadvi 1999c) and its implications for labour
agency (Lund-Thomsen 2013). Such local values can also
sharply differ, and potentially challenge, globally defined
normative perspectives on CSR (Khan and Lund-Thomsen
2011).
At the same time, national and regional policy frame-
works also impact on, and shape, local cluster governance,
especially on areas where rule making and enforcement on
social compliance concerns are involved. It is this aspect of
the institutional context, we argue, that is often neglected
in much of the cluster and GVC literatures. Although many
writers (including early work by Gereffi (1999) as well as
by Messner (2004)) make note of the importance of the
institutional context and the nature of local, regional,
national and global policy frameworks, this is an area that
is often overlooked in empirical cluster research. Similarly,
the cognate GPN framework, which in many ways is
conceptually more complex, also recognises the signifi-
cance of the national and local regulatory environment
(Henderson et al. 2002). Yet, as recent contributions have
indicated (Smith 2014) even in the multi-scalar GPN
framework, which not only addresses the issue of power
within vertical chain ties but also gives equal cognisance to
the horizontal linkages (and actors and processes) at each
distinct spatial node of the chain and how they impact on
chain dynamics, the role of public policy and the state
tends to be somewhat neglected.
Neilson and Pritchard (2009) in their highly influential
study of tea plantations in south India have emphasised the
importance of the institutional environment in shaping
GVC dynamics within the tea sector, and its consequences
for labour. By drawing on work from new institutional
economics (in particular from Williamson and North) they
show how an institutionally rich understanding can be
brought to traditional GVC analysis. In essence, such an
approach effectively integrates the vertical focus on chain
governance that underlies the GVC approach with the
institutionally richer analysis offered by the GPN approach
and the equal footing that this provides to the horizontal
planes or nodes at which vertical GVC linkages are loca-
ted. Yet, the institutional dimension still remains a gap
within cluster studies.3
Our argument in this paper is simple. In seeking to
understand how clustered firms in the Rising Powers engage
with corporate social responsibility (CSR) concerns, we
posit that this requires an interrogation of local cluster
dynamics and local cluster governance, global value chain
dynamics and GVC governance and an understanding of the
ways in which the national policy framework shapes the
public rules as well as the private norms that apply to social
compliance issues. How local clustered firms, for example,
meet labour and environmental standards is thus a complex
function of local attitudes and values with regards to these
concerns, national and international regulations on, and
enforcement of, labour and environmental norms as well as
the pressures on CSR issues that permeate down the value
chain. This, we argue, requires, inter alia, a greater under-
standing and awareness of the nature of the local and
national ‘social contract’ within which each individual
cluster is situated. Such a social contract includes the formal
and informal institutional arrangements, rules and norms in
a society, and refers among others to historically and cul-
turally shaped expectations concerning (minimally)
acceptable social and environmental behaviour by various
actors (Boucher and Kelly 2003, Donaldson and Dunfee
1994). Moreover, societies differ in how they assign primary
and secondary responsibility in upholding and monitoring
their social contracts to government, business and civil
society organisations. These ‘divisions of tasks’ are, how-
ever, not fixed. Cragg, for example, has argued that the
division of responsibilities between government and busi-
ness in the Western world on protecting human rights has
changed in recent decades (Cragg 2000). We will show how
differences in the social contracts of China, Brazil and India
help us to better understand different attitudes towards CSR
and distinct compliance practices in clusters in these three
Rising Powers.
In the next section we investigate these arguments in
greater detail, documenting not only the wide presence of
clusters in China, Brazil and India, and the cluster devel-
opment policy frameworks that have helped to shape these,
but also critically how the nature of the national ‘social
contract’ on labour and environmental concerns is likely to
affect the overall dynamics of local clusters in these
countries.
Rising Power Clusters, Institutional Frameworks
and the ‘Social Contract’ on Labour
and Environmental Concerns
This section seeks to map the presence of SME clusters in
Brazil, China and India. As we state at the outset, one
under-emphasised aspect of the international competitive-
ness of these distinct emerging economies is the
3 More recently Pyke and Lund-Thomsen (2014) have taken a first
step in this regard by seeking to provide an institutional dimension to
an understanding of the dynamics of the Sialkot sports goods sector.
Yet, as their work indicates, there is clearly a great deal of further
unpackaging needed to understand how institutional processes, actors
and drivers influence local cluster outcomes.
Challenges of Local and Global Standards
123
significance and importance of SME clusters within them,
and the role that they play in fostering industrial develop-
ment and trade. Clusters, we argue, are key to the economic
and trade dynamism observed in each of these Rising
Powers. Further underlying this we show how policy
frameworks have explicitly sought to promote cluster
development strategies in two out of these three countries.
Next, in light of our interests in how Rising Power clusters
engage with local and global standards relating to social
responsibility concerns, we look at the main drivers of
compliance. Finally, we outline the distinct social contracts
that apply in Brazil, China and India. We argue that while
engagement with standards partly differs by sector and by
case as illustrated in the case study literature, we also see
more structural differences in engagement with standards
between these three countries that can be traced back to
their different ‘social contracts’.
We start to discuss India, where the social contract
contains the lowest internal pressures towards compliance
with social standards, and where most clusters focus on cut
throat price competitive markets in which standards are
less important. China provides the in-between case, while
firms in Brazilian clusters are most familiar with actually
implemented public regulations and private compliance
expectations.
India
Clusters abound in India, both in a wide variety of indus-
trial, artisanal and agro-processing activities. Any trader
and most consumers in India can tell you that the better
shoes, locks, sarees, textiles, jewellery, pottery, etc. origi-
nate from specific cities or regions. According to the Indian
cluster observatory website (www.clusterobservatory.in)
there are more than 1,000 industrial clusters and over 6,000
micro-enterprise clusters. These together are said to
account for 45 % of total manufacturing production, 50 %
of total exports and 90 % of all enterprises in India. As a
phenomenon, clustering dominates the landscape for Indian
micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), with over
80 % of all MSMEs operating in spatially and sectorally
defined cluster settings, and over 90 % of MSME exports
originating from clusters. Clusters are also highly diverse
in India, from microenterprise based rural clusters, rural
and urban artisanal clusters, urban and peri-urban industrial
clusters, services clusters especially around the informa-
tional technology sector, and finally hub and spoke clusters
that operate around large enterprises (FMC 2007).
Clustering in India has been well studied in the aca-
demic literature (see, for example, the edited volumes by
Holmstrom and Cadene 1998; and Das 2005). Many of
these case studies marvel about the resilience of artisanal
clusters in a modernizing and increasingly globalizing
economy. While some emphasize more their competitive
dynamics, others stress the embeddedness of traditional
skills and the challenges of upgrading these clusters. A
number of authors explore the export competitiveness of
Indian clusters (see, for example, Knorringa 1999; Tewari
1999).
While clusters are not only widespread and have a long
history in the Indian context, institutional support for
cluster promotion is a relatively recent experience. The
Abid Hussain Committee in 1997 provided the first official
documentation on the extent of clustering and the need for
a focused policy framework targeted at clustered enter-
prises (Hussain 1997). The leading cluster development
programme within India at the time was that initiated by
the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
(UNIDO) in 1995 (Ceglie et al. 1999). This programme
initially focused its efforts on identifying and intervening
in a small number of pilot industrial clusters with the aim
of promoting networking and collaboration between clus-
tered firms to encourage technological upgrading and
improved marketing that could effectively strengthen the
national and international competitiveness of these clusters
(Russo et al. 2000). By 2003, the UNIDO programme
broadened its scope to include interventions that aimed
primarily to promote poverty alleviation in rural, peri-
urban and artisanal clusters. A cluster development strategy
was designed and implemented by UNIDO for the state of
Orissa, one of the poorest states in the Indian Union, and
targeted at a range of low-income artisanal clusters.
Towards the end of its programme the UNIDO initiative
focused on two specific aims. First, to mainstream the
cluster development strategy within Indian industrial and
SME development programmes. Second, to initiate an
agenda on clusters and corporate social responsibility
(FMC 2007; Gulati 2012).
On mainstreaming, the UNIDO programme was
incredibly successful. It was able to convince key gov-
ernment agencies on the potential benefits in terms of
economic, export, employment and incomes growth to be
had from targeted cluster development programmes (CDP).
The national Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium
Enterprises (formerly the Ministry of Small Scale Industry)
started with a budget of INR 7 billion (approximately US$
130 million) allocated to 24 CDPs to be completed by
2006, with cluster promotion interventions taking place in
over 1,300 clusters (FMC 2007). The primary objective in
these programmes was to strengthen infrastructure within
clusters, and a variety of national and state-level public and
private bodies were identified through which CDPs were to
be administered. The Government of India’s subsequent
11th Five Year Plan (2007–2012) earmarked INR 45 bil-
lion (approximately US$ 830 million) to cluster develop-
ment during the plan period while the 12th Plan
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(2012–2017) raised the overall budget for cluster devel-
opment strategies to US$ 2.5 billion (Planning Commission
Government of India 2013).
Cluster promotion strategies have involved a number of
federal level ministries (Ministry of MSMEs, Ministry of
Textiles, and Ministry of Commerce and Industry), state-
level governments (including the governments of Orissa,
Gujarat, Kerala, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and West
Bengal) and various parastatal agencies (including the
State Bank of India, the Small Industries Development
Bank of India, and the National Bank for Agricultural and
Rural Development) (FMC 2007). Cluster promotion
activities have focused on a range of areas, including the
development of networks to undertake bulk purchasing of
inputs (such as in the Bangalore machine tools cluster, the
Alleppy coir cluster, the Chanderi silk weaving cluster, the
Rajkot engineering cluster), the development of market
linkages through bulk tendering (such as in the Rajkot
engineering cluster), common market outlets (as in the
Ludhiana garment cluster) and the promotion of trade fairs
(as in the Jaipur handblock textiles cluster). A number of
CDPs have targeted technological upgrading and knowl-
edge dissemination, such as design development (in the
Jaipur handblock textiles and Chanderi handloom silk
textiles cluster), promotion of quality systems (as in the
Pune food cluster, the Tiruppur garment cluster) and
common training facilities (for example in the Jalandhar
cluster). Finally, infrastructure development and infra-
structure facilities have been central to CDPs focusing on
the tannery clusters in Tamil Nadu (through the develop-
ment of common effluent treatment plants), the Pune food
cluster (through the building of research and development
facilities) and the Bangalore machine tools cluster (through
the common design facility) (FMC 2007).
In ‘pro-poor’ interventions aimed primarily at rural and
artisanal clusters there has been a focus on the use of
micro-credit interventions, targeting of poor and vulnerable
workers and communities, the linking of health and edu-
cation to local entrepreneurship, the promotion of local
self-help groups (SHGs), and the training of women
workers (as seen, for example, in the UNIDO programme
in the Chanderi silk handloom cluster, the Orissa cluster
programmes, and the work of the Apparel Exporters
Association in the Ludhiana cluster) (Ray and Sarkar
2007). Finally, a few initiatives have sought to focus on the
promotion of corporate social responsibility concerns,
especially with respect to labour and environmental con-
siderations. One of the most significant of these has been
the interventions undertaken in the Jalandhar football
cluster (see Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2010b; Khara and
Lund-Thomsen 2012).
Our aim in this paper is not to assess the effectiveness of
the policy interventions on cluster development initiated by
UNIDO and then subsequently by various Indian public
agencies. This is clearly a key area for future research and
policy given the emphasis, and the budgets, being placed
on cluster development initiatives in India. Instead, what
we have sought to do here is to provide a sense of the wider
institutional policy framework that has been constructed to
promote growth and competitiveness of Indian MSME
clusters. We turn now to reviewing how the Indian expe-
rience on clusters, and cluster policy, has to be seen within
a wider understanding of the ways in which the ‘social
contract’ in Indian policy has been shaped.
While many of these clusters have been long-standing
and successful exporters, by far most of them focus on
relatively low quality markets, and specialize in relatively
smaller and flexible orders for more labour-intensive
varieties of traditional products. In many global value
chains Indian suppliers are seen as, and identify them-
selves, as ‘job-workers’, firms with little ambition towards
functional upgrading in the future but more interested in
making a margin today. This attitude among entrepreneurs
can at least partly be traced back to the traditional caste-
based division of tasks in many of these sectors, with a
chasm between traders as entrepreneurs and artisans as
workers. For example in the Agra footwear cluster, ‘traders
are predominantly forward caste Hindus, …, Sikhs and
some well-to-do Muslims.’ (Knorringa, 1999, p. 1591). In
turn, ‘footwear workers are predominantly Jatavs, a sub-
group of the Chamars, …, who are found close to the
bottom of the caste hierarchy.’ (ibid).
Production in many Indian clusters often takes place
either in home-based units run by artisans with mainly
family labour, or in workshops run by white-collar trader-
entrepreneurs who usually pay piece rates and often sub-
contract labour recruitment to some master-artisans
(Mezzadri 2014a, b). In such working environments labour
conditions cannot be gauged through an assessment of
formal labour contracts. Moreover, what in a ‘Western
consumer’ perspective would be seen as ‘child labour’, is at
local level identified as an ‘apprenticeship system’, which
allows young boys to learn the ‘tricks of the (caste-based)
trade’, often on a part-time basis. The absence of formal
contracts does not imply that workers are an anonymous
mass. Instead, intricate relations of obligation, debt and
patronage exist, but within a broader context of highly
exploitative labour relations. Volatility is a key character-
istic in the seasonal production patterns of most clusters,
and the dominant piece-rate system effectively passes on
this instability to workers (Mezzadri 2014a). While work-
ers may have the upper hand in a few peak-season weeks
every year, a labour surplus characterizes most clusters for
the main part of the year. Most trader-entrepreneurs simply
see labour as a cost, not a potential asset, and investing in
the quality of the labour force is virtually unheard of in
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these more traditional sectors. Only a very limited number
of relatively larger export-oriented firms in high-profile
consumer-facing sectors like garments and footwear actu-
ally offer labour contracts to workers.
As informality is the norm, an overwhelming majority
of workers in Indian clusters are unprotected by public
labour legislation and unions seldom achieve effective
countervailing power. Moreover, Indian entrepreneurs are
experts in manoeuvring around attempts by public private
and civic actors to regulate their behaviour. For example,
Mezzadri (2014a, b) reports how entrepreneurs in the
export-oriented garment industry subcontract the more
labour-intensive activities through layers of invisible con-
tractors, thus aiming to thwart effective compliance with
standards used by foreign brands. As most Indian clusters
tend to focus on producing for lead firms who are less
focused on compliance with labour and environmental
standards, both domestic and internationally, they do not
even need to try to thwart compliance. In effect, most
entrepreneurs in Indian clusters face few pressures to
comply with social responsibility concerns, neither from
their private value chain relationships nor from Indian
public agencies. Entrepreneurs may still wish to engage
with these responsibility concerns out of their own moral
values, but this would imply ‘going against the tide’ in the
predominantly cut-throat price-driven segments in which
they operate (see e.g. Das 2005).
Nevertheless, this rather gloomy picture from a social
responsibility perspective needs to be qualified on at least
three accounts. First, in a large country like India you are
likely to find exceptions. One instructive exception is the
case of environmental compliance in the leather sector
(Kennedy 1999; Tewari and Pillai 2005). Kennedy’s study
illustrated how civic pressure combined with judicial
intervention could bring about collective response to
address effluent treatment by tanneries in Tamil Nadu.
Tewari and Pillai (2005) show how the Indian leather
goods sector adjusted to a German ban on importing leather
goods that used PCP and Azo dyes. Because exports to
Germany were critically important to the Indian leather
goods industry (and vice versa!), producers could not
simply move towards alternative market outlets. Moreover,
German importers, industry associations, and governmental
agencies were keen to assist Indian actors to effectively
respond.
This case study from the Indian leather goods industry
shows how Indian government agencies (in particular the
Ministry of Commerce which saw a major threat to
exports), private firms and boundary spanning organiza-
tions (key business associations with quasi-governmental
status and a research and development (R&D) institute
subsidized by the government working on behalf of the
industry) entered into a process of ‘negotiated’ collective
action (Tewari and Pillai 2005). Instead of following the
dead-end standard approach of trying to force a sprawling
network of small-scale tanneries to stop using dyes with
these ingredients, the Indian government passed a law to
ban the import and production of dyes that contain PCPs or
Azo. Even though the chemical companies who produced
these dyes initially vigorously contested this ban, it turned
the input industry into a de facto diffuser of environmental
compliance among small-scale tanneries (Tewari and Pillai
2005). This would not have been possible without syner-
getic interaction between public and private compliance
mechanisms. While recent research emphasizes the
importance of these types of synergy and the relative
ineffectiveness of compliance mechanisms that aim to
‘stand on one leg’ (Knorringa 2014; Mayer 2014), more
longer-term collaboration between public regulators and
labour or environmental inspectors on the one hand, and
private compliance consultants on the other, is unlikely to
occur in India. In effect, this compelling case study (Tewari
and Pillai 2005) shows how far fetched such a successful
compliance scenario is for most artisanal clusters in India.
Second, many observers in India are enthusiastic about
the recent and ambitious implementation of what might
become a ‘social floor’ in the Indian labour market,
through the so called Employment Guarantee Act. Initial
findings suggest that in regions where these programs have
been implemented, the daily wage rate for unskilled labour
tends to rise, which makes it a potentially important
instrument to raise the effective—be it informal—mini-
mum wage level in India (Basu 2013). Finally, India
recently passed a law that obliges larger firms to re-invest
2 % of their turnover in CSR-related activities. It is too
early to assess whether this will become a significant driver
of more socially responsible investments in India (Gulati
2012).
Notwithstanding these qualifications, we conclude that
by and large the rather implicit Indian social contract does
not provide clustered entrepreneurs with any incentives to
engage with responsibility concerns. In some cases such
pressures are exerted through the value chain, but their
‘bite’ is often blunted by difficult to trace layers of sub-
contracting. Finally, for clustered entrepreneurs with per-
sonal moral incentives to engage with responsibility
concerns it is difficult to put this into practice. Most of
them compete in cut-throat price-driven market segments
without a premium for a higher responsibility profile (see
e.g. Khara and Lund-Thomsen 2012).
Brazil
While there are no accurate measures of the numbers of
clusters in Brazil, the phenomenon of clustering, known
locally within Brazilian policy circles as ‘arranjos
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productivos locais’ (APLs- or local productive arrange-
ments), is widespread. One recent study suggests over
2,000 potential cluster regions within the country (Pires
et al. 2013) while there are over 260 officially recognised
APLs. These include a number of cases that have been
documented in the cluster literature, such as the well-
known shoe cluster of Sinos Valley (Schmitz 1999; Bazan
and Navas-Alema´n 2004; Navas-Aleman 2011), the
ceramics cluster of Santa Catarina (Meyer-Stamer 1998),
the furniture clusters in Rio Grande de Sol and Santa
Catarina (Puppim de Oliviera 2008; Navas-Aleman 2011),
and the auto and auto components cluster of the Sao Paulo
ABC region (Quadros 2004; Lema et al. 2012). In addi-
tion to these relatively mature clusters located in rela-
tively more affluent regions of southern Brazil, there are a
number of clusters to be found in the more impoverished
Northeast states including the fruit clusters in the states of
Ceara and Rio Grande de Norte (Gomes 2006), the jeans
cluster of Toritama (Almeida 2008), and the organic
honey and oil for cosmetics clusters in Piauı´ and Ma-
ranha˘o states (Puppim de Oliviera and Fortes 2014).
Examples of Brazilian clusters extend from agro-pro-
cessing activities to labour-intensive manufacture, capital-
intensive and knowledge-intensive industries as well as in
the services sector. Moreover, clustered firms are engaged
in developing products and services for export and
domestic markets.
The promotion of industrial clusters has been a key
plank of Brazil’s industrial strategy, with a primary
objective of raising employment and incomes especially in
poorer regions in the country. As the strategy unfolded,
enhancing competitiveness of clustered firms also led to a
growing emphasis on firm and cluster upgrading. Thus, in
more recent years cluster promotion policies have in large
measure addressed firm-level technological upgrading,
cluster-level research and development activities including
building linkages with universities and research centres,
and improving the capabilities of clustered firms and
workers through training programmes. The key agencies
implementing these cluster development activities are the
Brazilian Support Service for Micro and Small Enterprises
(better known as SEBRAE) and the National Service for
Industrial Training (SENAI). SEBRAE employs more than
4,000 employees and over 9,000 consultants distributed
between the headquarters and 27 state-level centres who
deliver services to SMEs through 750 points of service
delivery. SENAI runs a large network of vocational train-
ing, technical education, and innovation of industrial
technologies initiatives. These institutional interventions
have a long history. SENAI, for example, was founded in
1942. It has over 780 operations unit, including 323 mobile
units, with many located in and undertaking specific
training functions for designated clusters.
Brazil is known for its relatively strong labour and
environmental regulations (Posthuma and Bignami 2014).
Yet, the Brazilian experience on the engagement of local
clusters with national social and environmental consider-
ations is mixed. Tendler (2002) made a very powerful
observation when she noted that in order to ‘protect’ rel-
atively weak and under-resourced SMEs Brazilian politi-
cians and government regulators would take a more lax
approach on the enforcement of labour, environmental and
social regulations for clustered firms. This ‘devil’s deal’ as
she coined it was seen as one way to promote small pro-
ducers in relatively backward regions.
Brazilian clusters have faced pressures on labour and
environmental norms. What distinguishes the Brazilian
experience is that while such pressures may emanate from
global buyers down the value chains to local clustered
suppliers,4 equally and in some cases more significant has
been the driver of domestic regulations and their enforce-
ment. As Puppim de Oliviera (2008) notes the literature on
clusters in developing countries rarely takes note of the
significance of national regulations on labour and the
environment, and its consequences for promoting social
upgrading.
Almeida’s study on how the Toritama jeans cluster in
Northeastern Brazil addressed environmental pollution and
improved working conditions illustrates how critical local
regulation and local public enforcement can be to envi-
ronmental and social upgrading within clusters. According
to Almeida (2008, p. 111) the Toritama cluster of 2,000
firms contributed 15 % of Brazil’s total blue jeans pro-
duction. The washing and chemical processing of jeans
required high levels of water consumption (in excess of 21
million gallons a month) and resulted in substantial levels
of polluted effluent discharge (twelve times the level per-
mitted under Brazilian environmental regulations). The
cluster’s laundry practices not only undermined the water
quality of the region but also led to very poor working
conditions, and meant high costs to firms in terms of their
need for scarce water that had to be transported to the
cluster. Almeida’ study illustrated how key private and
public actors within the cluster responded to these chal-
lenges. Firms realised the economic benefits to be had in
developing low cost technologies that not only reduced
pollution but also reduced water consumption costs for
firms by relying on recycled water. The public attorney’s
office, along with the state environment and water
resources agency, was able to initiate a dialogue with the
jeans laundries in the cluster to implement environmental
4 As in the furniture clusters of Rio Grande de Sol and Santa Catarina
where pressures to meet ISO 14000 and Forestry Stewardship Council
(FSC) standards on sustainable wood primarily came from European
Union buyers according to Puppim de Oliviera (2008).
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and labour upgrading strategies with support from SE-
BRAE and other public agencies. The ‘stick’ of public
enforcement (closure of laundries and the imposition of
fines and other legal and judicial procedures) was com-
bined with the ‘carrot’ of subsidies to undertake environ-
mental and social upgrading and the associated costs
reductions in water use (Almeida 2008).
Almeida’s case study is not unique in Brazil. The recent
study by Posthuma and Bignami (2014) underlines the
ways in public and private actors are able to come together
to address regulatory gaps and thus improve working
conditions. Drawing on the experience of the Saˆo Paulo
garment sector they illustrate how a private industry body,
the Brazilian Association of Apparel Retailers (ABVTEX),
was able to formulate a CSR initiative that sought to work
with the public labour inspectorate regime to enforce
labour standards down the garment value chain.
Labour regulation and enforcement in Brazil is notably
strong (Locke 2013). Pires’s (2008) study on the labour
inspectorate regime in Brazil shows how labour inspectors
work with local firms, including clustered SMEs and farms,
to address the root causes behind non-compliance and thus
not only seek to implement Brazil’s strict labour codes but
also to enhance the competitiveness of firms. As Pires
(2008, p. 225) notes, this experience points to a very dif-
ferent regime of enforcement wherein a combination of
‘sanction with assistance’ is more likely to lead to sus-
tainable outcomes. These observations are further borne
out in Coslovsky’s (2014) recent study which illustrates
how Brazil’s labour inspection regime works to enhance
labour outcomes as well as returns to firms. According to
Coslovsky (2008, p. 194) Brazil’s 3,000 labour inspectors
on aggregate undertake inspections that cover 22 million
workers a year (approximately one-fifth of the national
labour force). Alongside the labour inspectors are up to
10,000 labour prosecutors, an array of specialist labour
lawyers and a separate arm of the judicial system purely
focused on enforcing the various aspects of the labour
legislation. Drawing on evidence from four different sector
case studies, namely sugarcane harvesting in Sao Paulo
state, temporary agricultural workers in Parana state, and
the clusters of firework manufacturers in Minas Gerais and
charcoal producers (used for pig iron smelting) from
Eastern Amazonia, Coslovsky (2014) shows how the public
labour regulatory regime effectively led to improved out-
comes for workers, such as through reduced incidences of
accidents and better occupational health and safety stan-
dards (particularly noticeable in firework production),
improved working conditions, higher levels of formalisa-
tion of the labour force (especially pronounced in sugar-
cane harvesting), and substantial reduction in the extent of
servitude for workers in some of the sectors (such as in
charcoal production). What is also apparent from a number
of these cases was how the public inspectorate regime,
combined the ‘stick’ of judicial enforcement with changes
to the structure of the industry leading to closer ties
between charcoal producers and pig iron smelters, or
between sugarcane farms and the contract labour force
used for harvesting. These closer relationships have resul-
ted in wider changes in commercial practices, including
increasing mechanisation in some sectors (such as sugar-
cane harvesting), improved quality outcomes through pre-
ferred user-producer ties (as in the case of the charcoal
cluster) and enhanced national quality and safety standards
(as in the case of the fireworks sector which also helped the
sector to compete against lower quality Chinese imports).
The recent Brazilian experience suggests that what
Tendler earlier termed as the ‘devil’s deal’ between lax
enforcement of public regulations on labour and the envi-
ronment and the needs for SME clusters to be ‘protected’
has now moved towards a more positive outcome. Threats
of judicial sanction have combined with various forms of
public assistance to bring about outcomes for labour and
the environment across a number of sectors where clusters
dominate, as well as enhance the capacity of clustered
firms to upgrade and compete in national and domestic
markets. This is not to suggest that there is a completely
virtuous cycle in Brazil, but rather that the dominant ‘social
contract’ in Brazil provides many more in-built pressures
towards socially responsible behaviour from that seen in
India.
The engagement between the private sector and the state
around issues of corporate social responsibility is pro-
nounced in Brazil. Brazilian private capital has worked
closely with state institutions and labour bodies in taking
on board a number of international initiatives on CSR. This
includes, for example, the Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI) and the UN Global Compact (UNGC). There are
also a number of sector specific initiatives such as ABV-
TEX’s formulation of a domestic CSR code for the gar-
ment industry (Posthuma and Bignami 2014) and the role
of the Brazilian sugarcane industry association in
addressing ‘slave labour’ conditions in Brazilian sugarcane
cultivate and in helping to formulate the international
multi-stakeholder initiative (Bonsucro) seeking to improve
sustainability goals in the global sugar industry code
(author interviews, Saˆo Paulo, April 2014). Possible the
most significant example of private and public engagement
around CSR is the Brazil’s role as Chair and Secretariat of
the technical commission in the International Standards
Organisation (ISO) that defined the international ISO
26000 standards on social compliance (Pena 2014).
Within Brazil, firms do complain about the costs asso-
ciated with meeting Brazil’s labour and environmental
codes and regulatory regimes (Coslovsky 2014). This is
locally often termed as the ‘Brazil cost’, and a factor that
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can hamper the international competitiveness of Brazilian
producers against other lower costs and more weakly reg-
ulated producers in the developing world. However, the
evidence from Brazil on CSR engagement, suggests that
despite the anxiety expressed on high regulatory costs,
there is it appears a wider consensus between the state,
civil society actors and key elements of private capital
within Brazil that such labour and environmental norms,
and their enforcement, are in the long term for the good
(Posthuma and Bignami 2014).
China
China’s industrial development experience, and overall
dynamism, is both remarkably different from and sharply
distinctive to that seen in India and Brazil. In terms of trade
and industrial growth, China represents a different scale
and order of magnitude. Moreover, this has been achieved
over a much shorter period. China’s transition from a
global political superpower to becoming the rising global
economic power began in 1980 when the first of the Spe-
cial Economic Zones (SEZs), in Shenzhen, Zhuhai and
Shanton (Guangdong province) and Xiamen (Fujian prov-
ince), along the coastal belt, were opened up to foreign
investment and private capital (Ge 1999). The initial plat-
form for industrial and export growth was the city of
Shenzhen, on the border of Hong Kong, which grew in
terms of economic output at a phenomenal pace, 58 % per
year between 1980 and 1984 (Zeng 2011, p. 9), attracting
foreign direct investment particularly from Hong Kong and
Taiwan and migrant workers from other regions of China.
Shenzhen was soon followed by other major urban areas in
Guangdong province, and then by the greater Shanghai
region and the neighbouring provinces of Jiangsu and
Zhejiang, being opened up as SEZs or as designated Eco-
nomic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZs)
and Export Processing Zones (EPZs).
It is hard to gauge the exact numbers of clusters in China.
But the scale of clustering is substantial, its overall impact on
China’s economic and export growth huge (Zeng 2011).
Many of China’s leading industrial clusters have emerged
out of the SEZs. These include: the electronics and infor-
mation and communication technology cluster of Shenzhen
and the electronics and biotech cluster of Pudong, Shanghai
(ibid.). Some clusters are heavily dominated by foreign
direct investment—the most notable being the electronics
and computing cluster of Kunshan on the outskirts of
Shanghai which is in large measure a cluster of Taiwanese
firms that migrated from Taiwan to obtain lower wage cost
advantages. Similar patterns of foreign direct investment
driven clusters can be seen in other parts of Guangdong
province (most notably in the city of Dongguan) and the
wider Pearl River delta region (Enright et al. 2005).
Most Chinese clusters, however, have strong local roots.
Such clusters tend to be dominated by SMEs and usually
draw on a long standing tradition of local manufacturing
skills, specialised capabilities and tacit artisanal knowl-
edge, a history that often predates the Communist era.
Many of the small and medium sized private firms that
dominate these clusters have emerged out of town and
village enterprises (TVE). The main concentrations of
clusters are nevertheless along the coastal belt, and in
regions that are well connected in terms of logistics, and
domestic and export markets. These include the provinces
of Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangsu and Guangdong. A number of
towns have emerged as leading centres of sector specia-
lised production. For example, Qiaotou, Zhejiang province,
a small town of 65,000, accounts for 60 % of world pro-
duction of buttons with 500 factories generating a total
output of nearly US$ 1 billion (Dinh et al. 2013,
pp. 243–246). Yangzhou, Zhejiang province with a popu-
lation of 36,000 is the toothbrush capital of China where 80
firms generated output of US$ 1.5 billion in 2009, and
accounted for 35 % of the global market, and 90 % of the
Chinese market (ibid: 261). Datang, again in Zhejiang
province, is the world’s centre for sock production with
over 5,000 firms (Zeng 2011). Haining, Zhejiang province
has 400 warp knit factories with over US 1.1 billion of
output of warp fabrics (Dinh et al. 2013, p. 236). Dies-
hiqiao, Haimen, Jiangsu province is the leading centre for
home textiles manufacture in China—for both domestic
and export markets (ibid.). And, according to Zeng (2011),
the 228 clusters in Guangdong province together accounted
for 25 % of the provincial gross domestic product (GDP).
There is no explicit policy framework for cluster
development in China. However, while the central gov-
ernment has determined the planning framework behind
the SEZs, the ETDZs and the new Hi-Tech Industrial
Development Zones (HIDZ) from which many clusters
have emerged; the key policy actor for most clusters is
local government. City and municipal administrations have
been particularly influential in assisting local SME clusters,
especially through fiscal incentives, infrastructure devel-
opment, marketing linkages and via targeted support from
R&D and training institutions. City and municipal level
governments also link closely to provincial government
institutions in supporting local industrial strategies.
Chinese firms’ engagement with corporate codes of
conduct has been closely studied, illustrating that such
private measures often fail to improve working conditions
(Sum and Pun 2005; Yu 2008) More recently there is
evidence that Chinese firms engaged in GVC ties can and
do engage more positively with CSR concerns (Egels-
Zande´n 2014). It is also clear that environmental consid-
erations are increasingly becoming part of the Chinese
industrial regulatory framework (Brandi 2014). There is a
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growing emphasis placed by national, provincial, and local
governments to reduce environmental impacts, improve
water and air qualities as well as promote green economy
initiatives. Moreover, the labour regulations framework,
including the labour contracts law of 2008 and the mini-
mum wage legislation is being more actively used by the
state, at various levels, to address issues in the labour
market (Chan 2010) and drive geographical shifts in some
labour industries away from relatively higher waged and
better regulated regions along the southern coast to regions
with lower wages and relatively more lax regulatory
enforcement (Zhu and Pickles 2014). These developments
help to shape our understanding of the institutional land-
scape within which Chinese clusters operate and the nature
of the consequent social contract that applies.
Chinese manufacturing firms have been challenged over
a number of years for their poor working conditions, their
excessive reliance on long working hours and the nature of
control exercised over dormitory based migrant workers
(Chan 2010). Migrant workers, with limited citizenship
(hukou) rights at their places of work, provide a labour
regime in China that is associated with high levels of
labour exploitation. Workers often work 10–12 hours a day
(albeit 2–4 of these hours would be on an overtime basis)
for 6 days a week. In many sectors pay is predominantly
based on piece-rated production. Workers have limited
representation and collective bargaining rights with factory
unions usually being led by management nominated offi-
cials. The national-level trade union, the All-China Fed-
eration of Trade Unions (ACFTU) is a direct arm of the
state and the Party (Chan and Hui 2014).
Consequently, many leading Western global brands
have required their Chinese suppliers to conform to their
specific codes of conduct. The compliance practices around
such private codes, and their wider implications for
workers and workers’ outcomes, have been substantially
challenged by various authors, with documented evidence
of labour abuse, poor working conditions and the control of
workers that arise from the dormitory labour system (Chan
2003; Pun 2005; Sum and Pun 2005; Pun and Smith 2007;
Chan 2010). While independent collective bargaining
rights remain restricted in China, workers do exercise
agency. The most obvious is through high levels of labour
turnover, especially at the time of the annual Chinese new
year holidays. At the extreme, there are now numerous
cases of worker agitation and protest, including organised
and wildcat strikes and at its most poignant form a number
of cases of workers’ suicides (Chan and Hui 2014).
In recent years, the Chinese state has sought to respond
to growing labour, and environmental, concerns through a
variety of public regulatory initiatives. These have inclu-
ded the Labour Contract Law of 2008, the minimum wage
legislation, social insurance legislation and a range of
environmental measures (Brandi 2014; Chan 2010; Chan
and Zhai 2013). There are also debates, and in some cases
shifts in local policy, around extending some hukou (local
citizenship) rights to migrant workers. One consequence of
this has been the annual increases in minimum wages in
much of the coastal regions, with minimum wages in
Shenzhen rising by around 10 % a year over the past
decade. There has also been a greater public investment
with enhancing the standards regime in China, improving
particularly standards related to quality assurance, food
safety, and environmental impacts as well as a greater
emphasis on investing in product standards. These moves
within the regulatory environment are given shape by
national government, and implemented by provincial and
local governments. However, China’s devolved adminis-
trative structures have meant that public regulatory inter-
ventions, and their effective enforcement, are regionally
uneven. Some of the most significant interventions are
observed in the more developed coastal provinces. A key
aspect of this is that in some regions, and clusters, local
minimum wage legislations, enforcement of the contract
labour laws and social insurance provisioning, as well as
pressures around enforcement of environmental regula-
tions, is resulting in both industrial upgrading as well as
shifts in the geographies of production (Zhu and Pickles
2014).
China, therefore, presents a much more complex land-
scape in some ways then that seen in Brazil or India. SME
clustering is not only extensive it is also a significant ele-
ment behind China’s phenomenal record of industrial
competitiveness. At the same time, while there is no clear
and explicit national policy framework focusing solely on
SME clusters, unlike the earlier initiatives around SEZs,
there is substantial local government support to local
industrial clusters, especially through infrastructure and
R&D investments. It is also apparent, that there is an
emergent ‘social contract’ being discussed and shaped in
China particularly on environmental but also on labour
issues. This is not as clearly marked as we observe in
Brazil, yet in terms of public policy it appears far more
substantial in terms of its overall impact as compared with
India.
Shaping a New Research Agenda on Rising Power
Clusters and Labour and Environmental Standards
The importance of both the global value chain and local
cluster dynamics in explaining the attention given to labour
and environmental standards has already been highlighted
in the literature on this topic. In this paper we aim to add
another dimension: an understanding of the ways in which
the national policy framework shapes the public rules as
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well as the private norms among local clustered entrepre-
neurs that apply to compliance with labour and environ-
mental standards. We argue that we also need a better
understanding of the nature of the local and national ‘social
contract’ within which each cluster and entrepreneur is
situated. Moreover, these processes interact. Private stan-
dards pushed down through the value chain ‘touch down’
(Helmsing and Vellema 2011) on more ‘fertile ground’
when public regulation is more effective and when local
entrepreneurs are more receptive to responsibility
pressures.
While both the small firm cluster and the CSR/standards
literature are booming, the overlap is as yet rather limited.
The reason for that seems obvious: small firm clusters are
not seen as pro-active but as passive secondary actors—
followers, implementers—of new ways of thinking around
CSR and standards that originate at higher levels of the
value chain, among lead firms, NGOs and consumers.
Small firm clusters are seen as the ‘cheap workshops of the
world’, a least likely suspect for researchers interested in
the dynamics around environment and labour standards.
But this may be a too simplistic way of looking at the role
of clusters, in particular those in the Rising Powers, for
several reasons.
First, we have tried to argue the existence of significant
differences in the ‘social contracts’ in India, Brazil and
China, and that these at least partly set the boundary con-
ditions for cluster actors. Therefore, next to a continued
focus on how lead firms selectively push for standards’
compliance, future research should connect this focus with
more explicit attention for the extent to which national and
regional policy frameworks, public regulation and its
implementation differ. This can help us to identify under
which ‘social contract’ the interaction between private and
public governance on standards is more likely to lead to
virtuous enforcement cycles.
Second, entrepreneurs in Rising Power clusters may
well have their own—indigenous—traditions of CSR,
which are more implicit and are not well recognized in the
‘Anglo-Saxon’ business literature. The little research on
these indigenous traditions tends to focus on responsible
behaviour among entrepreneurs and with other value chain
actors, and may well include ‘enlightened’ patron-client
relationships with workers. Such relationships may de-
facto reduce insecurity for workers, but cannot withstand
the scrutiny of formalised labour standards given their high
levels of dependence of workers on their employer.
A future research agenda could develop some hypothe-
ses and questions to make sure that we ‘see’ these more
localised forms of CSR, to avoid getting ‘locked-in’ to only
seeing ‘western’ ‘formalised’ standards. It would be
important to create space to be able to follow up whether
these more localised indigenous forms of CSR play a role
(enabling/disabling) in clusters being able/willing to con-
form to standards from outside, and/or are more likely to
experiment with their ‘own’ standards. In other words, is a
more extensive ‘invisible’ indigenous tradition a useful
‘training ground’ for formalised social standard imple-
mentation and commitment, or are these so different that an
indigenous tradition may actually make it more difficult to
implement formalised standards? This also connects to the
debate between certification as ‘ticking the boxes’ versus a
commitment approach (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen
2014). Our hypothesis is that an indigenous tradition is a
more likely stepping stone for a commitment approach,
while it may hamper a ‘ticking the boxes’ approach.
Third, Rising Power clusters actually do not always
consist of only small firms, and therefore do not always fit
the conventional ‘developing country’ cluster perception.
Perhaps especially in China quite some clusters seem to
propel forward new lead firms, or at least firms that become
major first-tier suppliers that also become at least partly
responsible for standards implementation. Therefore, future
research on Rising Power clusters related to standards
requires very careful sampling procedures that take into
account size distributions of firms, cluster structures, but
also the extent to which firms have experience and capa-
bilities in handling labour and environmental standards
through a ‘ticking the boxes’ modality or a more com-
mitment focused approach with longer-term value chain
relationships, or both.
Fourth, many Rising Power clusters seem to operate in
both international and domestic markets, and are more
likely to acquire more lead firm characteristics in the rap-
idly expanding domestic middle class markets. If and when
they perceive market opportunities for labour and envi-
ronmental standards attached to premium domestic market
segments, they could in principle quite easily apply their
acquired know how from working along labour and envi-
ronmental standards in their export channels. A key ques-
tion would then be: when do domestic upmarket retailers in
the Rising Powers, together with lead firms, see a need or
an opportunity to attach a labour and/or environmental
standard to products they produce for domestic markets. Of
course, not all production for export markets uses social
and/or environmental standards, but by and large the more
mature firms in the more competitive small firm clusters do
have capabilities and experience with social standards.
Future research could follow through the main value chain
connections from these Rising Power clusters to the
wholesalers/retailers for domestic middle class consumers,
to investigate to what extent a demand for social standards
seems to be ‘in the air’, and which actors are the more
likely ones to spearhead an initiative to develop and
implement a labour or environmental standard in the
domestic market. This would also require a focus on other
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actors that can influence the perceived need/opportunity for
standards in the (premium) domestic market, like consumer
awareness and labour activists and NGOs, trade unions,
and politicians.
In operationalizing a research agenda on clusters and
standards three other characteristics of especially larger
and more heterogeneous clusters need to be taken into
account. First, vertical subcontracting relationships in
clusters often make it very difficult to assess whether
standards are really fully implemented, or whether a part of
the production process takes place outside the main first-
tier factory and escapes standards implementation.
Researchers need sharp local ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ to make sure
they can be confident about their assessment of the extent
to which informal subcontracting is used to side-step cer-
tification costs. Second, different sub-segments of firms
may live within their own ‘silos’ and that makes it difficult
if not simply incorrect to talk about these clusters as fol-
lowing one strategy towards, for example, dealing with
standards. Clusters have different levels of homogeneity/
heterogeneity in terms of the type of market segments they
serve, quality and technology levels, type of firms, and
more heterogeneous clusters may find it more difficult to
develop more coherent responses to standards challenges.
For example, more heterogeneous clusters will find it more
difficult to ‘brand’ their cluster with buyers to represent a
specific (high) quality level in production and standards
compliance. Future research on the interface of cluster and
standards thus needs to establish in advance the relative
homogeneity/heterogeneity of the studied clusters. Finally,
next to the direct value chain actors, cluster-level business
associations, local government agencies, local offices of
national ministries like trade and industry, local unions and
NGOs can also play key roles in determining perceptions
and practices in relation to standards and compliance
among local entrepreneurs. In many ways these indirect
cluster actors reconfirm the main planks of the respective
social contracts in the three Rising Powers, and in that way
co-shape cluster and entrepreneur’s behaviour.
Conclusion
Clusters have been a key part of the industrialization
strategies of the Rising Powers. Indian clusters are based
more often on artisanal skills and lowest cost labour-
intensive production of semi-traditional products, while
Brazilian and Chinese clusters more often focus on higher
value added industrial manufacturing. In India and Brazil,
major national-level policy incentives have been directed
towards cluster development, in order to achieve employ-
ment creation and poverty alleviation. In China mainly
local governments have supported clusters as a vehicle to
achieve their mind-boggling growth rates in recent
decades.
We have proposed that next to know-how about how
lead firms push standards through the chain, future research
should also pay attention to the ways in which national and
local policy frameworks and social contracts co-shape
public rules as well as private norms on compliance with
labour and environmental standards. After all, the interac-
tion between value chain pressures and the localised social
contract provide the context within which local clustered
entrepreneurs strategize.
We have argued that cluster entrepreneurs in India
operate under a social contract that does not incentivize
them to comply with the ‘letter’ of labour and environ-
mental standards, let alone with the ‘spirit’ of these stan-
dards. Brazil provides the contrasting case, where
meaningful enforcement of public labour and environ-
mental regulation is by and large the rule (and not the
exception, like in India). China offers the intermediate
situation, where shifting alliances and tensions between
national and local governments lead to a social contract in
which compliance with a variety of public regulations
might at times be more negotiable than in Brazil, but it
cannot be simply ignored like in India. Future research on
clusters and social and environmental standards would do
well to include these contextual factors, as more demand-
ing social contracts clearly offer a more fertile ground for
virtuous interaction patterns between public regulation and
private standards.
Our emphasis on the importance of the national policy
framework mirrors the growing body of literature on what is
increasingly referred to as a ‘regulatory renaissance’ where
public agencies undertake collaborative and complementary
roles in CSR, filling gaps that exist around private codes and
standards (Amengual 2010; Locke 2013; Piore and Schrank
2008; Sabel and Zeitlin 2013). As Levi-Faur and Starobin
(2014) have recently argued there is a need for greater
emphasis on what they term as the ‘rule-takers’ and the ‘rule
intermediaries’ who link them to the ‘rule makers’ within
regulatory frameworks. The boundaries between these cat-
egories can, however, shift with national states and global
lead firms being both rule makers and rule takers.
The research agenda that we suggest, which places a
renewed interest in the ‘local’ and the ‘public’ spheres of
labour and environmental regulatory interventions, can
start by making more visible existing indigenous CSR
traditions among local entrepreneurs in clusters and
explore how these traditions can be used as a stepping-
stone for more recognized compliance with evolving
societal expectations. Moreover, Rising Power clusters are
of particular interest as a possible transmission mechanism
between two distinct markets. They play a key role as first-
tier suppliers to many global brands—and as such possess
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the experience and capabilities needed to comply with the
most stringent standards. But Rising Power clusters are
also home to more and more lead firms that cater to
emerging middle class markets in the Rising Powers and
the global South. These clusters could, therefore, pioneer
with introducing social and environmental standards for
premium segments in their domestic markets, depending on
how they perceive emerging consumer preferences for
more responsible products. This might propel clusters in
Rising Powers to the forefront of a next frontier in the
discussion about standards: how will new middle class
consumers from countries like China, India and Brazil
influence the uptake and depth of a next generation of
labour and environmental standards?
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